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I. INTRODUCTION

A.

Water as a Private/Public Resource

B.

Water Quantity vs. Water Quality

C.

Federal vs. State Roles

D.

The Interiurisdictional Dimension

E.

The Pluralistic Model Under the Clean Water Act, the
Endangered Species Act and the Federal Power Act

F.

Nonstatutory Federal Water Quality Law (including
Indian treaties and the Common Law)

II. STATE/FEDERAL RELATIONS

A. Relationship Between CWA and State Water Quality Laws

1.

CWA section 510 (33 U.S.C. S 1370) provides that
the CWA does not limit states' authority to
regulate water quality, as long as states do not
attempt to adopt or enforce standards more lenient than those under the CWA. States may adopt
and enforce more stringent standards. See,
e.g., U.S. Steel Corp. v. Train, 556 F.2d 822

(7th Cir. 1977) (state limitations supercede
less stringent CWA standards).

2.

While the CWA provides for use of state and
local agencies in achieving its goals, it does
not constitute a grant of federal powers to
those agencies. Thus, state and local agencies'
powers to regulate water quality are limited to
powers granted under state law. Northern
Colorado Water Conservancy Dist. v. Board of
County Commissioners of the County of Grand, 482
F. Supp. 1115 (D. Colo. 1980).

B. Federal Waivers of Sovereign Immunity

1.

CWA section 313 (33 U.S.C. § 1323) requires all
federal facilities and activities to comply with
substantive as well as procedural aspects of
state water quality laws. This section was
amended in 1977 to reverse a U.S. Supreme Court
decision holding that federal facilities need
not obtain an NPDES permit from states with EPA
approved permit programs. See EPA v. California, 426 U.S. 200 (1976).

a.

Courts are split over whether this section
waived federal sovereign immunity from

civil penalties assessed against the federal government under state water quality
laws. See Ohio v. U.S. Dep't of Energy,
689 F. Supp. 760 (S.D. Ohio 1988) (section
313 waives federal sovereign immunity from
civil penalties "arising under" federal
law, including state laws implementing
state NPDES permit program); California v.
U.S. Navy, 845 F.2d 222 (9th Cir. 1988)
(section 313 does not waive federal sovereign immunity from state civil penalties).

2.

CWA section 404(t) (33 U.S.C.

1344(t)) sub-

jects federal agencies discharging dredged or
fill material into the navigable waters of a
state to the substantive and procedural requirements of state law to the same extent as any
person.

a.

Friends of the Earth v. U.S. Navy, 841 F.2d
927 (9th Cir. 1988) held that the state of
Washington's Shoreline Management Act (SMA)
regulates dredging and water quality, obligating the Navy to obtain an SMA permit.
The court also held that the Coastal Zone
Management Act does not affect the CWA's
waiver of sovereign immunity.
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C. Clean Water Act § 402 (33

1.

U.S.C. §

1442)

Section 402(b) allows states to take over issuance of NPDES permits from EPA. EPA must turn
over permit issuance authority to a state if the
state satisfies statutory and regulatory criteria (see § 402(b), 40 C.F.R. § 123), including
having a procedure to consider recommendations
of other states which may be affected by issuance of a particular NPDES permit (see
§ 402(b)(5)).

a.

EPA may withdraw approval of states' NPDES
permit issuance authority. See § 402(c).

b.

For a discussion of friction between EPA
and the state of Colorado over Colorado's
attempts to make its NPDES program less
restrictive, see T. Foster, EPA versus
Colorado: National Unity versus State
Flexibility, 1 Nat'l Res. & Envt. 27
(Winter 1986).

2.

Section 402(d) authorizes EPA to veto a stateissued NPDES permit and issue its own permit.
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a.

EPA regulations set forth the grounds upon
which EPA must base a veto under S 402(d).
See 40 C.F.R. S 123.44. EPA may veto a
state permit if the permitting state has
rejected recommendations from an affected
state without adequate reasoning. See 40
C.F.R. S 123.44(c)(2).

b.

When EPA vetoes a state NPDES permit and
assumes permitting authority, such action
is not judicially reviewable until EPA
actually issues its own permit or refuses
to issue a permit altogether. Champion
International Corp. v. EPA, 850 F.2d 182
(4th Cir. 1988). The Champion court also
held that EPA had properly assumed permitting authority from North Carolina when
that state refused to alter a permit to
take Tennessee's water quality standards
into account.

c.

While federal courts may review EPA's veto
of a state NPDES permit (after EPA itself
acts to issue or deny the permit), federal
courts cannot review EPA's refusal to veto
a state permit. District of Columbia v.
Schramm, 631 F.2d 845 (D.C. Cir. 1980).

-

-

However, in Save the Bay, Inc. v. EPA, 556
F.2d 1282 (5th Cir. 1977), the court noted
in dicta that a court could review an EPA
refusal to veto a state permit if a party
claimed that the proposed permit contained
a violation of federal guidelines which EPA
had not considered, or if a party alleged
that unlawful factors had tainted EPA's
exercise of its discretion. State courts
are the proper forum for resolving questions about state-issued NPDES permits.

d.

EPA's veto of a permit issued by the State
of Washington was invalid because it was
based on an ad hoc determination of what
constituted the best practicable technology
for a certain plant rather than uniform
effluent standards applicable to the
industry as a whole. State of Washington v. EPA, 573 F.2d 583 (9th Cir. 1978).
See also Cleveland Electrical Illuminating
Co. v. EPA, 603 F.2d 1 (6th Cir. 1979) (EPA
abused its discretion in vetoing state permit); Ford Motor Co. v. EPA, 567 F.2d 661
(6th Cir. 1977) (EPA veto invalid because
agency did not base decision on guidelines
or express statutory provision).
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e.

Alleged EPA "coercion" did not transform an

NPDES permit decision of a state agency
into a federal agency action reviewable in
federal court. Shell Oil Co. V. Train, 585
F.2d 408 (9th Cir. 1978).

D. Clean Water Act S 401 (33 U.S.C. § 1341)

Section 401(a) requires each applicant for a federal
license or permit whose activity "may result in any
discharge to the navigable waters" to obtain certification from the state in which the discharge would
originate that the discharge will comply with state
water quality standards and CWA effluent limits.
Absent state certification, the federal agency may
not issue the license or permit. Under § 401(d),
states may place conditions on their certification.
These conditions become conditions on the federal
permit.

1.

Federal permit programs which require § 401
certification.

a.

EPA has given the states no guidance as to
which federally permitted activities are
subject to § 401 certification. EPA regu-
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lations simply restate statutory language
(see 40 C.F.R. S 121.1(a)).

b.

FERC licenses for dam construction are
subject to S 401 certification. See 18
C.F.R.

4.38(e)(2) (FERC regulations

requiring S 401 certification).

c.

The

401 certification requirement seems

to be limited to point sources, since the
statute applies to "any discharge." But
see Runsel & Meyers, State Water Quality
Certification and Wetland Protection: A
Call to Awaken the Sleeping Giant, 7 Va. J.
Nat. Res. L. 339, 347-48 (1988) (suggesting
that S 401 applies to nonpoint sources as
well).

2.

Impacts states may consider in the S 401 certification process.

a.

Although the issue has not been definitively settled, the wording and legislative
history of S 401 suggest that states may
evaluate all of the water quality implications of a project over its lifetime when
making a

401 certification decision, not
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merely immediate point source discharges.

es-

See Ransel & Meyers at 348-53.

b.

In Power Authority v. Williams, 101 A.D.2d
659 (N.Y. App. Div. 1984), a New York state
court held that "discharge" within the
meaning of S 401 included pollution arising
from causes other than specific discharges
of identifiable pollutants. The court
found that a transfer of water from an
upper reservoir to a lower reservoir was a
discharge within the CWA's broad definition
of the term, where the transfer could
affect water temperature.

3.

State law requirements relevant to

401

certification.

a.

Under

401(d), states may condition S 401

certifications to satisfy "any ... appropriate requirement of state law." It is
unclear whether "appropriate" state laws
include only those dealing with state water
quality standards required by CWA S 303 or
whether a state can impose conditions based,
on any state law that somehow relates to
water quality.
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b.

It is also unsettled whether states may
deny. a certification based on "appropriate"
state laws mentioned in

401(d), or

whether states may only deny certification
if a federally permitted activity will violate the CWA sections listed in § 401(a).
Courts have split on this issue. In Marmac
Corp. v. Dep't of Natural Resources of West
Virginia, No. 81-1792 (Cir. Ct. Kanawha Co.
1982), the court held that West Virginia
could deny certification on the basis of
appropriate state laws mentioned in
§ 401(d). However, in Arnold Irrigation
Dist. v. Dep't Environmental Quality, 717
P.2d 1274 (1986), the Oregon Court of
Appeals held that a state may not base §
401 certification denial on state law
alone, unless the state law implemented the
CWA sections listed in § 401(a). However,
the court interpreted § 401(d) broadly,
noting that states may condition (but not
deny) a § 401 certification on the basis of
virtually any state law somehow related to
water quality. States may be able to avoid
this issue altogether by incorporating all
state laws related to water quality into
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their water quality standards adopted pursuant to

CWA s

303. Tennessee has adopted

this approach. See Hollis v. Tennessee
Water Quality Control Bd., No. 83-1352-I
(Tenn. Ch. Cpp. 1984) (denial of certification based on definition of pollution within state S 303 water quality standards).

E. Clean Water Act Section 303 (33 U.S.C. S 1313)

1.

Section 303(c) requires states to adopt
"designated uses" of navigable waters.

a.

EPA regulations require that designated
uses include all uses actually being
attained (40

b.

C.F.R.

131.10(i)).

In Order to designate uses below the goal
of "fishable-swimmable" waters set forth in
CWA section 101(a)(2), states must find
that this goal cannot be met even after
imposing the technology-based effluent
limitations required by CWA sections 301(b)
and 306 and implementing controls on nonpoint sources (40

C.F.R.

S 131.10(j)).

However, EPA's authority to enforce this
requirement is uncertain. The court in

Associated Industries of Alabama v. Train,
9 E.R.C. (BNA) 1561 (N.D. Ala. 1976)
invalidated EPA's disapproval of Alabama
water quality standards under a similar
regulation, holding that the CWA did not
authorize EPA's minimum "fish and wildlife"
standard. Moreover, private parties cannot
assert such an argument if the state involved does not object to the EPA's minimum
standards. See Homestake Mining Co. v.
EPA, 477 F. Supp. 1279 (D.S.D. 1979).

2.

Section 303(c) requires states to adopt water
quality standards to protect designated uses,
and at least once every three years review and,
if appropriate, modify these standards. EPA
evaluates state standards, and promulgates its
own substitute standards if a state refuses to
modify state standards EPA deems inadequate.

a.

Neither section 303 nor EPA regulations
specify the minimum number or type of pollutants for which states must establish
water quality criteria. Though EPA undoubtedly has authority to require states to
regulate a certain pollutant or promulgate
its own standard for that pollutant, EPA
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has wide discretion in deciding which
pollutants require standards, as well as
over what type of standards are necessary.
See Board of County Commissioners of
Calvert County v. Costle, No. 78-0572
(D.D.C. 1980); Environmental Defense Fund
v. Costle, 657 F.2d 275 (D.C. Cir. 1981).

b.

EPA regulations require states to base narrative water quality criteria on "biomonitoring methods," and require numerical
standards to be based on either EPA "guidance" criteria promulgated under section
304(a) or "other scientifically defensible
methods" (40 C.F.R. S 131.11(b)). In
Mississippi Comm'n on Natural Resources v.
Costle, 625 F.2d 1269 (5th Cir. 1980), the
court upheld EPA's refusal to consider economic data in promulgating a more restrictive standard for dissolved oxygen than
Mississippi deemed adequate.

c.

Persons may not challenge EPA decisions on
state water quality standards under the
CWA's citizen suit provision, but may be
able to do so under S 702 of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). Scott v.
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City of Hammond, Indiana, 741 F.2d 992 (7th
Cir. 1984).

3.

EPA regulations contain an antidegradation policy
which requires states to implement a policy protecting water quality necessary for existing
instream uses (40 C.F.R. § 131.126(a)(1)). Also,
where water quality exceeds the "fishable-swimmable" standard, states must protect existing
water quality rather than simply protecting
existing uses (40 C.F.R. § 131.12(a)(2)).

a.

States may permit degradation of high quality waters above the "fishable-swimmable"
level if existing uses are not harmed and
the state finds the action "necessary to
accommodate important economic or social
development" (40 C.F.R. § 131.12(a)(2)).

b.

States may not permit any water quality
degradation of water designated by a state
as an Outstanding National Resource Water
(40 C.F.R.

4.

131.12(a)(3)).

EPA must approve various state water quality
implementation plans.
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a.

Section 303(e) requires states to have an
approved "continuing planning process."
Failure of a state to have an approved
planning process precludes EPA from authorizing that state to issue NPDES permits.
Under this section, EPA need only approve
the planning process in general, not the
specific plans produced by the process.
City of New Haven v. Train, 424 F. Supp.
648 (D.C. Conn. 1976). EPA regulations
outline the required contents of the
continuing planning process. See 40 C.F.R.
S 130.5.

b.

Section 303(d) requires states to identify
water for which CWA effluent limits are insufficient to meet applicable water quality
standards, as well as establish total maximum daily loads (TMDL) for problem pollutants. If EPA approves a state's findings
and TMDL's, this becomes part of the
state's 303(e) plan. If EPA disapproves,
it must itself identify problem areas and
set TMDL's. Failure of a state over a long
time period to submit proposed TMDL's may
amount to "constructive submission" of no
TMDL's, triggering EPA's obligation to
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approve such action or set TMDL's itself.
Scott v. City of Hammond, Indiana, 741 F.2d
992 (7th Cir. 1984). The CWA citizen suit
provision permits persons to challenge
EPA's failure to promulgate TMDL's for a
recalcitrant state. Id.

c.

Section 208 (33 U.S.C. 5 1288) requires
states to formulate and submit for EPA
approval waste treatment management plans
for areas with substantial water quality
problems. EPA may provide grants to help
implement approved plans, including grants
to control non-point source pollution.

d.

Section 319 requires states to formulate
management programs for controlling nonpoint source water pollution, including
identification of best management practices
for reducing non-point source pollutants.
EPA must approve state programs in order
for states to be eligible for implementation grants.

5.

Regulation of federal non-point pollution
sources.
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a.

States may enjoin federal activities causing non-point source pollution which leads
to a violation of state water quality standards. This is true even if the federal
activity complies with best management
practices set by the state. Northwest
Indian Cemetery Protection Association v.
Peterson, 795 F.2d 688 (9th Cir. 1986),
rev'd on other grounds, 108 S. Ct. 1319.

b.

Since non-point source pollution is not
subject to standards enforceable under 33
U.S.C. S 1311(b)(1)(C), private individuals
may not sue federal non-point polluters
under the CWA's citizen suit provision
(plaintiffs were forced to employ this circuitous attempt to proceed under the CWA
because the statute's citizen suit provision, S 505, does not list state water
quality standards adopted pursuant to S 303
as enforceable by interested parties).
However, citizens may enforce alleged state
water quality standard violations against
such a polluter pursuant to the APA. Oregon
Natural Resources Council v. U.S. Forest
Service, 834 F.2d 842 (9th Cit. 1987).
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F. Clean Water Act § 404 (33 U.S.C. § 1344). Section
404 authorizes the Army Corps of Engineers to issue
permits for discharge of dredged or fill materials
into navigable waters at specified sites.

1.

Sections 404(g) and (h) allow states to assume
permitting authority for dredged and fill discharges into so-called "non-traditionally navigable" waters, which are not presently used or
"susceptible" to use as a means to transport
foreign or interstate commerce (i.e., not traditionally navigable waters).

a.

EPA regulations set forth components state
programs must include to win approval. See
40 C.F.R. § 233.

b.

Only Michigan has taken advantage of this
provision to assume 404 permitting authority. See 40 C.F.R. § 230.60.

2.

Section 404(j) authorizes EPA to object to 404
permits a state proposes to issue.

a.

If the state permitting agency does not
alter the permit to satisfy the objections,
EPA may assume authority over that permit.
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b.

EPA may waive its authority to review certain types of state-issued permits. See

404(k); 40 C.F.R. S 233.51.

EPA may withdraw its approval of a state permit-

3.

ting program if the program is not in accord
with S 404 or its implementing regulations. See
S 404(i); 40 C.F.R. S 233.53.

G.

Wallop Amendment to the Clean Water Act

In 1977, Congress added section 101(g) (33 U.S.C.
1251(g)) to the CWA. Known as the Wallop Amendment,

101(g) provides that nothing in the CWA shall

supercede or abrogate states' right to allocate water
or established state water rights. It also directs
federal agencies to cooperate with state and local
agencies to eliminate pollution "in concert with"
water management programs. For courts' interpretation of this provision, see discussion of Riverside
Irrigation Dist. v. Andrews, III(A)(2)(b), infra.

H.

Electric Consumer Protection Act of 1986 (EPCA).

The EPCA amended the Federal Power Act. Under these
amendments, states have increased authority to make
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recommendations to the Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission (FERC) concerning proposed hydroelectric
power projects' effects on fish and wildlife. This
authority presumably extends to recommendations on
water quality issues, since water quality affects
fish and wildlife. For further discussion, see
III(c)(2), infra.
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III. INTRAFEDERAL RELATIONS

A. Endangered Species Act, Section 7 (16 U.S.C.

1536)

When it enacted the ESA, Congress articulated a federal policy to conserve species listed as threatened
or endangered "regardless of cost." See Tennessee
Valley Authority v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153 (1978). As of
1988, 76 species of fish native to the United States
were listed. Significant changes in the quantity or
quality of a water resource could also affect many
other listed species. Section 7(a)(2) prohibits any
federal or federally-authorized activity which jeopardizes the continued existence of any listed
species or destroys or adversely modifies a listed
species' critical habitat.

1.

Whenever an agency action may affect listed
species, the agency must consult with the Fish
and Wildlife Service or National Marine Fisheries Service (the Secretary). The Secretary
issues a biological opinion detailing the project's effects on listed species and concluding
whether or not the project is likely to violate
7(a)(2). If the project may violate this section, the Secretary sets forth "reasonable and
prudent alternatives" which would avoid such a
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result. While courts accord the biological
opinion "great weight" when reviewing an
agency's compliance with § 7(a)(2), the action
agency retains discretion to decide whether or
not to proceed with a project. See Stop H-3 v.
Dole, 740 F.2d 1442 (9th Cir. 1984).

a.

In Nebraska v. Rural Electrification
Administration, 12 E.R.C. (BNA) 1156 (D.
Neb. 1978), the court found that REA and
the Corps had violated section 7 by failing
to consult with the Secretary prior to providing financial guarantees and issuing a
404 permit, respectively, for the proposed
Grayrocks Dam, when operation of the dam
could affect listed species.

b.

To prevent a project from gaining momentum
prior to completion of § 7 consultation,
7(d) forbids any irreversible or irretrievable commitments of resources prior to the
time the Secretary issues a biological
opinion. The Nebraska v. REA court, supra,
held that REA's funding guarantees and the
Corps' grant of a 404 permit for the Grayrocks Dam constituted such unlawful
resource commitments (construing FWS
regulations later codified as S 7(d)).
- 22 -

c.

Section 7(h) authorizes a committee made up
of Cabinet-level officials to grant exemptions from S 7. To date, the Committee has
considered only three exemption requests,
all prior to 1980. It granted an exemption
for the Grayrocks Dam, but the exemption
merely ratified an agreement worked out by
the parties prior to the Committee's consideration of the issue. See The 1978
Amendments to the ESA: Evaluating the New
Exemption Process Under S 7, 9 E.L.R.
10,031 (1979).

2.

Impacts considered during

a.

7 consultation.

In National Wildlife Federation v. Coleman,
529 F.2d 352 (5th Cir. 1976), rehearing
denied, 532 F.2d 1375, cert. denied under
Boteler v. NWF, 426 U.S. 979 (1976), the
court made it clear that a project's indirect as well as immediate impacts on
listed species should be considered during
7 consultation.

- 23 -

b.

In Riverside Irrigation Dist. v. Andrews,
568 F. Supp. 586 (D. Colo. 1983), aff'd,
758 F.2d 508 (10th Cir. 1985), plaintiffs
challenged the Army Corps' refusal to grant
a 404 permit for a proposed dam due to
adverse impacts the dam's operation would
have on whooping crane habitat downstream.
The court held that

404 of the Clean

Water Act permitted the Corps to consider a
project's potentially deleterious downstream effects on listed species when deciding whether to issue a 404 permit. The
court found that since the Corps could consider such impacts under S 404, it was
required to do so under the ESA. Finally,
the court held that CWA S 101(g), the socalled Wallop Amendment, had no bearing on
its holding even if action by the Corps
under S 404 affected state water right law.
The Tenth Circuit upheld the district
court's holding on S 101(g), but also noted
in dicta that a fair reading of the Wallop
Amendment indicated that where both a
state's interest in allocating water and
the federal government's interest in protecting the environment are implicated,
Congress intended "an accommodation," which
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could best be reached in the context of an
individual permit process. 758 F.2d at
513.

3.

Agencies' duty to conserve listed species.

a.

ESA SS 2(c)(1) and 7(a)(1) affirmatively
require federal agencies to use their
authorities to conserve (i.e., further the
recovery of) threatened and endangered
species.

b.

When she issues a biological opinion after
S 7 consultation on a proposed project, the
Secretary may include "conservation recommendations" to assist the action agency in
meeting its duty to conserve listed
species. While the Secretary interprets
agencies' compliance with such recommendations as wholly discretionary (see 50
C.F.R. S 402.14(j)), the legal significance
of such recommendations has never been
litigated.
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4.

Section 7's effect on water issues.

A 1987 GAO report concluded that S 7 has had
little effect on water development in the arid
West, where the greatest potential for conflict
exists between water users and species' needs.
This conclusion holds true even for the oversubscribed Platte and Colorado River systems,
for which various strategies have evolved to
avoid jeopardy biological opinions.

a.

The Secretary has issued several so-called
"Windy Gap" biological opinions (so named
after the first opinion, concerning the
Windy Gap diversion). In return for a
water developer's agreement to pay a fee
based on water depletion to be caused by a
proposed project, the Secretary issues a no
jeopardy biological opinion and uses the
money for research, habitat enhancement,
and other species conservation measures.
However, critics have charged that these
payments do not compensate for harm to
species caused by diminished flows. This
arrangement also is of questionable legal
validity under the ESA, as FWS assesses
fees based purely on plugging a project's
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anticipated water depletion into a mathematical formula, rather than on the cost of
specific actions necessary to offset the
project's adverse impacts on listed fish
species. This scheme is arguably outside
the scope of the Secretary's authority
under ESA S 7.

b.

Federal and state agencies and interested
groups have formed "coordinating committees" for the Colorado and Platte systems
in an attempt to formulate and secure funding for fish conservation plans which will
not interfere with water development.

5.

Section 9.

a.

Section 9 forbids all persons -- not just
federal agencies -- from taking species
listed as endangered. ESA regulations also
prohibit takings of most threatened species
(see 50 C.F.R. S 17.31(a)). "Harm" to a
listed species is included within this
taking proscription (see 16 U.S.C.
1532(19); 50 C.F.R. S 17.3). Harm includes
foreclosing a species' prospects for
recovery. Paula v. Hawaii Dept. of Land
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and Natural Resources, 649 F. Supp. 1070

(D. Ha. 1986), aff'd, 852 F.2d 1106 (9th
Cir. 1988).

b.

Section 10 permits takings "incidental to,
and not the purpose of, the carrying out of
an otherwise lawful activity." However,
the Secretary may set forth mandatory
reasonable and prudent measures to minimize
incidental takings caused by a federal
activity. See 16 U.S.C. S 1536(b)(4). The
Secretary has similar power with respect to
all other entities. See 16 U.S.C.
S 1539(a)(2).

6.

The Simpson Amendment

In 1982, Senator Simpson added a clause to the
ESA providing that "Federal agencies shall
cooperate with state and local agencies to
resolve water resource issues in concert with
conservation of endangered species." See 16
U.S.C. S 1531(c)(2). It is unclear whether this
language gives states any voice in S 7 consultation or any other federal interagency cooperation pursuant to the ESA.
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B.

Clean Water Act S 404

1.

Section 404(b)(1) requires each 404 permit
issued by the Army Corps of Engineers to be
consistent with guidelines developed by the
Corps "in conjunction with" EPA. This
statutorily mandated power sharing arrangement
is unique in American environmental law. The
guidelines appear at 40 C.F.R. S 230.

a.

The 404(b)(1) guidelines include a presumption that dredged or fill material should
not be discharged into the aquatic ecosystem unless it can be demonstrated that a
proposed discharge will not have an "unacceptably adverse impact" on an ecosystem.
See 40 C.F.R. S 230.1(c).

b.

The Corps recognizes the 404(b)(1) guidelines as binding, and denies 404 permits to
activities which would not comply with the
guidelines. See 33 C.F.R. S 320.4.

2.

Section 404(c) authorizes EPA to in effect veto
404 permits issued by the Corps. EPA may take
such action when it determines, after public
participation and consultation with the Corps,
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that a proposed discharge will have an "unacceptable adverse effect" on water supplies,
fish, wildlife, or recreation areas.

a.

EPA's veto authority is a means to enforce
the 404(b)(1) guidelines. EPA regulations
provide that the agency will consider the
guidelines when deciding whether to exercise its veto authority. See 40 C.F.R.
$ 231.2(e).

b.

EPA has used its $ 404(c) authority to veto
only five 404 permits. When EPA has vetoed
a permit, however, courts have showed
deference to the agency's determinations.
See, e.g., Bersani v. EPA, 674 F. Supp. 405
(N.D.N.Y. 1987), aff'd, 850 F.2d 36 (2d
Cir. 1988). Therefore, EPA essentially can
employ

404(c) to override aberrant inter-

pretations of the 404(b)(1) guidelines by
the Corps. See Blumm, A Guide to Federal
Wetlands Protection Under Section 404 of
the Clean Water Act, 46 Anadromous Fish L.
Memo, at 27 (1988).

c.

In late March, 1989, EPA Director William
Reilly announced that EPA intended to veto
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a 404 permit granted by the Corps for the
Two Forks Dam southwest of Denver.

C. Federal Power Act, As Amended by the Electric
Consumers Protection Act (16 U.S.C. SS 791a-823)

Under the FPA, the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) has authority to license hydropower dams
on navigable waters of the United States.

1.

Section 4(e) (16 U.S.C.

797(e)) provides that

FERC may issue licenses for projects within
federal land reservations only upon making a
finding that the project will not interfere with
the purpose for which the reservation was created, and that the license shall be subject to
conditions the federal land management agency
deems necessary for "the adequate protection and
utilization of such reservation."

a.

In Escondido Mutual Water Co. v. La Jolla
Band of Mission Indians, 104 S. Ct. 2105
(1984), the Supreme Court rejected FERC's
longstanding view that conditions set forth
by other federal agencies pursuant to S
4(e) were simply advisory. The Court
unanimously concluded that the statute's
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plain meaning required FERC to impose S
4(e) conditions set forth by federal land
managers in whose jurisdiction a hydropower
project was to be built. However, the
Court also concluded that land managers
could not attach such conditions to protect
federal reservations located downstream of
a proposed project. Finally, the Court
ruled that an Indian tribe could not prevent FERC from licensing projects on tribal
land.

b.

In 1988, FERC held that BLM had no authority to require FERC to obtain a right of
way from BLM prior to authorizing construction of a hydroelectric project on BLM
land. See 44 FERC $ 61,076. While this
decision suggests that FERC takes a narrow
view of Escondido, this case differed
substantially from Escondido in that BLM
did not attempt to argue that the project
was to take place on a federal "reservation," nor did the agency submit conditions
pursuant to S 4(e). However, since the
FPA's broad definition of "reservation"
includes "lands and interests in lands
acquired and held for any public purposes"
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pa.

(16 U.S.C.

796(2)), ELM land arguably

could be considered a federal reservation.

2.

Consideration of a project's impacts on fish and
wildlife.

a.

Section 10(j) (16 U.S.C. § 803(j)), added
in 1986 by the EPCA, requires FERC to
include in its licenses conditions to
protect, mitigate damage to, and enhance
fish, wildlife and habitat affected by a
project. The statute requires FERC to base
these conditions on recommendations of the
Fish and Wildlife Service, National Marine
Fisheries Service, and state fish and wildlife agencies received pursuant to the Fish
and Wildlife Coordination Act. FERC may
reject such recommendations only after (1)
explicitly finding that a recommendation is
inconsistent with the FPA's purposes and
requirements; and (2) attempting to resolve
the inconsistency, giving "due weight" to
the recommending agency's expertise and
statutory responsibilities. Congress
viewed this section as "unmistakably
upgrad[ing] the status of recommendations
by [state and federal fish and wildlife
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agencies]." See H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 934,
99th Cong., 2d Sess. 23 (1986).

b.

In Confederated Tribes and Bands of the
Yakima Indian Nation v. FERC, 746 F.2d 466
(9th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct.
2358 (1985), the court held that the FPA
requires FERC to make the same inquiries,
including consideration of protective
measures for fish and wildlife, in relicensing proceedings as it makes during initial
license determinations. The court also
disapproved of FERC's practice of issuing
hydroelectric licenses while deferring fish
and wildlife measures until after studies
are completed.

c.

The EPCA also added protection, mitigation,
and enhancement of fish, wildlife, and
habitat to the factors FERC must consider
when adopting license conditions (see 16
U.S.C. S 803(a)), as well as adding a
provision requiring FERC to give "equal
consideration" to fish and wildlife and
other aspects of environmental quality when
deciding whether to issue a license (see 16
U.S.C. S 797(e)).
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3.

FPA S 18 (16 u.S.c. S 811)

a.

This section provides that FERC shall
require its licensees to construct
"fishways" recommended by the Secretaries
of the Interior or Commerce.

b.

In Lynchburg Hydro Assoc., 39 FERC 1 61,079
(1987), FERC acknowledged that S 18
empowered the Secretaries of Interior and
Commerce to prescribe mandatory conditions
for construction, operation, and maintenance of fishways. However, FERC took a
very narrow view of this power, drawing a
distinction between "fishways" and "more
far-reaching conditions" for protection,
mitigation and enhancement of fish
resources which FERC noted it would consider as agency recommendations under S
10(j). FERC also noted that it intended to

define the scope of the Secretaries' S 18
power on a case-by-case basis.

c.

In Lynchburg and a subsequent case,
Commonwealth Hydroelectric, Inc., 41 FERC
1 62,309 (1987), FERC attempted to draw a
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distinction between fish screens suggested
by the Secretaries, whose sole purpose was
to protect fish from project induced injury
or mortality -- and thus were merely recommendations under S 10(j) -- and screens to
provide for upstream and downstream fish
passage, which FERC maintained the Secretaries could mandate under

18.

D. Fish and Wildlife Coordination Act (16 U.S.C.
SS 661-667(e))

1.

The FWCA requires federal agencies to consult
with FWS and relevant state fish and wildlife
agencies whenever they undertake or authorize
diversion or impoundment on any stream or body
of water, or water is "otherwise controlled or
modified for any purpose ..." 16 U.S.C.
S 662(a).

a.

Federal agencies must give "full consideration" to recommendations they receive pursuant to the FWCA. Id. at S 662(b).

b.

The Federal Power Act contains a higher
standard than "full consideration" applicable to FERC decision making. See
III(C)(2)(a), supra.
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2.

Very small projects and activities by federal

agencies on federal land "primarily for land
management and use" are exempt from consultation
requirements. Id. at S 662(h).
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IV. INTERSTATE RELATIONS

A. Common Law

1.

In City of Milwaukee v. Illinois and Michigan
(Milwaukee II), 101 S. Ct. 1784 (1981), the U.S.
Supreme Court held that the 1972 amendments to
the Clean Water Act had preempted the federal
common law of nuisance in the area of water pollution. The Court emphasized this holding in
Middlesex County Sewage Authority v. National
Sea Clammers Assoc., 101 S. Ct. 2615 (1981), as
well as held that persons who suffered as a
result of CWA violations had no implied right of
action under that statute. Thus, a suit under
the citizen suit provision of the CWA constitutes the sole federal remedy available to a
state or individual aggrieved by water pollution
originating in another state.

2.

In International Paper Co. v. Ouellette, 107 S.
Ct. 805 (1987), the Supreme Court found that the
CWA preempted common law nuisance claims against
an out-of-state point source polluter when the
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action is based on the law of the affected state
rather than common law of the state in which the
source is located. The Court reasoned that to
hold otherwise would seriously interfere with
objectives of the CWA by potentially subjecting
point sources to several state discharge standards rather than a uniform standard under the
CWA. But the Court permitted state common law
suits based on the law of the state in which the
point source is located, regardless of where the
suit is actually brought. The Court reasoned
that since the CWA allows a state to adopt
stricter standards than those set forth in the
CWA, the statute does not preempt state common
law to the extent that it regulates point
sources within that state.

B. Clean Water Act

1.

Section 402(b)(5) provides that in order to
assume NPDES permitting authority from E.P.A., a
state must have a procedure to allow other
states whose waters may be affected by issuance
of a permit to submit written recommendations to
the permitting state. If the permitting state
fails to accept these recommendations, it must
notify the affected states and EPA, as well as

- 39 -

give its reasons for rejecting the comments.
EPA regulations allow the Administrator to use
his S 402(d) veto power over state NPDES permits
if a permitting state rejects other states'
recommendations without adequate reasons. 40
C.F.R. S 123.44(c)(2). See also Champion
International Corp. v. EPA, II(c)(2)(b), supra.

2.

When a state establishes designated uses for
water bodies within its borders pursuant to
S 303, as well as water quality standards to
protect those uses, the state must take into
consideration water quality standards downstream. A state must "ensure that its water
quality standards provide for the attainment and
maintenance of the water quality standards of
downstream waters." 40 C.F.R. S 131.10(b).
This requirement has potentially far-reaching
interstate implications because it could allow
downstream states (probably with EPA concurrence) to force upstream states to adopt stricter water quality standards than those states may
wish to adopt. There seems to be no express procedure to implement this requirement, however.
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C. Interstate Compacts and Agreements

1.

The Clean Water Act directs EPA to encourage
"cooperative activities" between states to prevent, reduce, and eliminate water pollution. 33
U.S.C. § 1253(a). In the same section Congress
also gave its consent for two or more states to
enter into compacts promoting cooperative water
pollution control efforts and establishing
interstate agencies to further such efforts.

2.

Interstate compacts essentially are binding
contracts between states. Agreements between
states constitute a compact when they "tend to
increase the political power of states at the
expense of the federal government." Northeast
Bankcorp, Inc. v. Board of Governors, 472 U.S.
159 (1985). Congress must ratify compacts.
When ratified, compacts become federal law
reviewable in federal court. See, e.g., League
to Save Lake Tahoe v. Tahoe Regional Planning
Agency, 507 F.2d 517 (9th Cir. 1974), cert.
denied, 95 S. Ct. 1398 (1975). There are at
least three examples of compacts dealing with
water quality.

e"
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a.

In 1968, California and Nevada entered into
a compact creating a regional agency to
protect the Lake Tahoe region, including
the waters of the lake itself. See Cal.
Gov't Code S 66,800.

b.

Connecticut, Maine, Massachusetts, New
Hampshire, Rhode Island, and Vermont have
entered into a compact creating the New
England Interstate Water Pollution Control
Commission. The Commission establishes
water quality criteria for interstate
waters by approving classifications submitted by appropriate agencies of each state.
See Conn. Gen. Statutes SS 22a-309 for text
of the compact.

c.

In the 1980 Northwest Power Act (16 U.S.C.
S 839b) Congress authorized the states of
Idaho, Montana, Oregon and Washington to
establish the Northwest Power Planning
Council, an interstate compact agency. The
Council promulgates (1) conservation and
electric power plan for the Northwest, and
(2) a fish and wildlife protection and
restoration program for the Columbia Basin,
including improved fish flows. See Seattle
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Master Builders v. Northwest Power Planning
Council, 786 F.2d 1359 (9th Cir. 1986)
(upholding the constitutionality of the
Council); Blumm, Reexamining the Parity
Promise: More Challenges Than Successes to
the Implementation of the Columbia Basin
Fish and Wildlife Program, 16 Envtl. L. 461
(1986).

D. Equitable Apportionment

In Idaho ex rel. Evans v. Oregon and Washington, 103
S. Ct. 2817 (1983), the Supreme Court extended the
equitable apportionment doctrine to anadromous fish.
The Court saw no difficulty in extending the doctrine
to resources similar to interstate water flows,
reasoning that a state may not preserve solely for
its own inhabitants a natural resource located within
its borders. Conceivably, this reasoning could extend
to interstate water quality concerns. For example,
if two adjacent states had similar water quality
standards, an upstream state could pollute an
interstate river to the maximum extent permissible
under the water quality standards. As a result, any
pollution added from sources in the downstream state
would violate the water standards, thus inhibiting
development in the downstream state. The downstream
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state could petition the court to apportion water
quality in the river, or more accurately, to
apportion the right to pollute the river equally
between the two states.
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V. INTERJURISDICTIONAL RELATIONS
INVOLVING INDIAN TRIBES

A. Clean Water Act

1.

When it amended the CWA in 1987, Congress provided that EPA may treat Indian tribes as states
for purposes of most of the CWA's key substantive provisions. See 33 U.S.C. S 1377. Therefore, EPA can authorize tribes to establish
designated uses and water quality standards
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under S 303, certify federal permits under
s 401, take over NFDES and 404 permitting

authority pursuant to S 402 and S 404, and
receive grants for waste management and nonpoint management planning.

2. In order to qualify for treatment as a state for
CWA purposes, a tribe must satisfy the following
conditions (see 33 U.S.C. S 1377(e)):

a.

The tribe must have a governing body which
carries out "substantial governmental
duties and powers."

b.

Functions to be exercised by the tribe
under the CWA must pertain to management
and protection of water resources held by
the tribe, held by the U.S. in trust for
the tribe, held by a tribal member subject
to a trust restriction on alienation, or
within the borders of a reservation.

c.

The tribe must be capable, in EPA's judgment, of carrying out CWA responsibilities.

3.

In addition to the qualifications listed above,
a tribe must be recognized by the Secretary of
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the Interior. See 33 U.S.C. S 1377(h)(2). The
amendments specifically declined to address
whether Alaska Native groups meet this standard.
Id. at S 1377(0.

4.

Congress provided that tribes' authority to act
as states under the CWA does not affect states'
authority to allocate water resources or existing state water rights. However, this subsection also provides that tribes shall be treated
like states for purposes of allocating water
resources and protecting existing rights. 33
U.S.C. S 1377(a).

5.

Congress authorized tribes and the state or
states in which tribal reservations are located
to enter into "cooperative agreements" to jointly plan and administer CWA programs. EPA must
approve such agreements. 33 U.S.C. S 1377(d).

6.

EPA recently issued interim regulations to
implement the 1987 amendments related to tribal
authorities. See 54 Fed. Reg. 14,354 (Apr. 11,
1989).
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B. Indirect Tribal Authority Over Water Resources

1.

Because of 19th century treaties signed to avoid
an Indian war in the Pacific Northwest, certain
Indian tribes are entitled by treaties to 50% of
the anadromous fish destined to pass their customary fishing stations. U.S. v. Washington,
384 F. Supp. 312 (W.D. Wash. 1974), aff'd, 443
U.S. 658 (1979). Over the past decade, however,
courts have wrestled with the question of
whether these tribes possess a so-called "environmental right," a right to enjoin both state
and federal government entities from carrying
out or authorizing activities which may jeopardize fish habitat, including activities affecting water quality.

a.

In U.S. v. Washington (Phase II), 506 F.
Supp. 187 (W.D. Wash. 1980), a federal
district court held that the treaties did
contain an implied environmental right.
The court held that when a tribe demonstrated a challenged activity produced fishery
habitat degradation, the burden shifted to
the state to show that the tribe's right to
a "moderate living" would not be impaired.
However, the Ninth Circuit ultimately
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vacated the decision due to an insufficient
factual base to define the scope of tribes'
rights. See 759 F.2d 1353, 1357 (9th Cir.
1985). Another federal district court
applied the test set forth by the Washington district court, but simply remanded the
issue of whether an activity would degrade
fishery habitat and reduce fish runs for
trial. See No Oilport! v. Carter, 520 F.
Supp. 373 (W.D. Wash. 1981).

b.

In U.S. v. Adair, 723 F.2d 1395 (9th Cir.
1983), cert.

denied, 467 U.S. 1252 (1984),

the court held that treaty fishing rights
include rights to water flows necessary to
support fishing as necessary to provide for
the livelihood of tribal members. The
court noted that the water right dated from
"time immemorial" rather than the date of
any treaty or reservation.

c.

In Kittitas Reclamation Dist. v. Sunnyside
Reclamation Dist., 763 F.2d 1032 (9th Cir.
1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1032, the
circuit court upheld a district court order
requiring dam releases to preserve salmon
redds, after the Yakima Nation sought pro-
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tection of their treaty fishing rights.
The appellate court held that the district
court's order was not precluded by a water
adjudication proceedings in state court nor
an earlier consent decree which did not
consider the rights of the Yakima Nation.

d.

In Joint Bd. of Control v. U.S., 832 F.2d
1127 (9th Cir. 1987), cert.

denied, 108 S.

Ct. 1732, the court affirmed minimum flows
to protect treaty fishing rights despite
diminished availability to irrigation
users. The court ruled that because the
treaty fishing right was a "time
immemorial" right, it was prior to any
irrigation right, and thus not subject to a
duty of "fair and equal distribution" of
irrigation water under the Dawes Act (25
U.S.C.

e.

384).

In Muckleshoot Indian Tribe v. Hall, 698 F.
Supp. 1504 (W.D. Wash. 1988), the court
enjoined construction of a marina which
would have blocked the tribe's access to a
tribal "usual and accustomed" fishing
ground. The court held that the tribe's
treaty right to access and use of the
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fishing grounds could not be impaired or
limited absent an act from Congress.

2.

Courts have also ruled that, apart from treaty
language, land reservations may contain reserved
water rights for fish. These rights are confined
to on-reservation fishing; they do not extend to
all usual fishing stations like the treaty
right. Nevertheless, they may affect off-reservation actually because of their early priority
date (date of the reservation).

a.

In U.S. v. Anderson, 6 Indian L. Rep. F-129
(E.D. Wash. 1979), the court ruled the
Spokane Tribe had a reserved right to maintain Chamokane Creek at a temperature of no
greater than 68°F. to preserve the fish
upon which the tribe depended. Upstream
appropriators were thus restrained from
diminishing the streamflow below 20 cfs.

b.

In Colville Confederated Tribes v. Walton,
752 F.2d 397 (9th Cir. 1985), the court
awarded 350 acre-feet per year to the tribe
to permit natural instream spawning of Omak
Lake trout. Since this right had a priority date of date of the reservation, it was
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subject to proportionate sharing with
reserved irrigation rights with the same
date.
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